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ARENA: A CRITICAL CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK  
OF TOP MANAGEMENT SELECTION 
 
Abstract 
While the selection of top managers is vital to the performance and survival of organizations, 
the process by which these managers are selected remains uncharted territory. In this 
conceptual article, we propose that both structural conditions of and the selection process for 
top management positions are different from those at lower organizational levels. We build on 
the existing literature on succession, tournament models, and promotion systems to 
characterize top management selection. The main situational component of this 
characterization is that of relative versus absolute selection, which leads us to adopt the 
“arena” as a metaphor and critical framework for top management selection. Finally, we argue 
that due to certain cognitive features, the arena is an efficient but not necessarily effective 
selection process, which may contribute to side effects and negative outcomes for 
organizations. We conclude by setting the agenda for further research on top management 
selection.   
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While the selection of top managers is vital to the performance and survival of most if 
not all organizations, the process by which these managers are selected remains largely 
uncharted territory. Increasingly common stories of executive failure have led some experts in 
the field to question whether this failure is a direct result of executive selection failure 
(Hollenbeck, 2009a; Zaccaro, 2010). But even without taking failure into account, there is a 
dearth of knowledge in research and practice on how selection decisions for top managers and 
especially CEOs (chief executive officers) are made. To enhance our understanding of top 
management selection, Hollenbeck (2009a) argues that the selection of top managers should 
be differentiated from selection at lower hierarchical levels in organizations. In this 
conceptual article we start from a brief review of literature on top management and its 
structural conditions, explaining why the selection process for top management positions is 
indeed different. Next, we build on the existing literature on tournament models, promotion 
systems, executive selection, and (CEO) succession and succession planning, to characterize 
the selection process for top managers. The main feature of this characterization is that of 
relative versus absolute selection, which leads us to adopt the “arena” as a metaphor for an 
integrative and critical conceptual framework for top management selection. We will argue 
that the arena consists of situational components characterized as (a) situated performance in 
specific social work situations, (b) interpersonal competition or comparison between 
candidates on (c) primarily emergent selection criteria, where (d) decision makers from the 
dominant organizational elite decide who succeeds, and where (e) criteria for entry differ 
from the criteria for success. Finally, we argue that due to certain cognitive features, the arena 
is an efficient but not necessarily effective process, which may contribute to side effects and 
negative outcomes for organizations. We conclude by setting the agenda for further research 
on the top management selection process. 
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With this contribution to the third special conceptual issue of Group & Organization 
Management we aim to provide insight into and understanding of the actual selection process 
at top management levels in organizations by taking an approach to theory development that 
entails equal measures of spotting knowledge gaps and of constructing mystery (Alvesson & 
Kärreman, 2007). We propose a critical and integrative conceptual framework that can serve 
as a roadmap for the empirical study of the process of selecting a candidate for a top 
management position within a given organization. In doing so, we also contribute to the 
understanding of executive failure and executive selection failure.  
When we talk about top management positions or top managers we refer to the CEO, 
executive committee (ExCom) members, executive board members or “inside directors,” top 
management team (TMT) members, and their direct reports. Therefore, we focus on a 
relatively small number of people or positions inside large scale organizations with several 
hierarchical levels. As “executive” is not a commonly used term outside the context of Anglo-
Saxon corporate governance systems with a one-tiered board, we prefer to use the more 
generic term “top managers.” When we talk about selection, we refer to the selection of 
internal candidates (by means of promotion and succession planning) and not to the selection 
of external candidates (by means of executive search and hiring). This delineation serves to 
reduce the complexity of our argument, even if the formal and informal selection procedures 
(Withers, Hillman, & Cannella, 2012) and the basic cognitive processes used in internal and 
external selection decisions are quite similar (Perry, Davis-Blake, & Kulik, 1994). This 
delineation is justified further by the evidence of relatively limited external mobility among 
executives (Hamori & Kakarika, 2009), with a stabilized percentage of around 25% outsider 
appointments of CEOs in the last decade in both the United States and Western Europe (Booz 
& Company, 2011). In most cases, therefore, a positive (or effective) outcome of the internal 
selection process implies promoting an optimal candidate for the position.  
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Top Management Levels in Organizations 
Two distinct theoretical traditions describe the unique nature of top management 
levels in organizations and how positions and structural conditions at these levels differ from 
other hierarchical levels in organizations. Theories of executive leadership and in particular 
stratified systems theory (Hooijberg, Hunt, & Dodge, 1997; Hunt, 1991; Jaques & Clement, 
1991; Zaccarro, 1996) highlight the increasing complexity of managerial tasks and especially 
decision making at consecutive hierarchical levels. The second theoretical tradition is known 
as the upper echelon perspective (UE) and highlights the significant impact of demographic 
characteristics (e.g., functional expertise) and composition of top management teams (TMT) 
on strategic decision making and organizational performance (cf. Hambrick & Mason, 1984; 
Carpenter, Geletkanycz, & Sanders, 2004). Hambrick, Finkelstein, and Mooney’s (2005) 
conceptualization of executive job demands (e.g., extreme pressure, limited resources) and 
“executive hubris” (i.e., exaggerated self-confidence) adds to our understanding of the 
structural conditions as well as cognitive features of top management decision making. At the 
same time, Hambrick (2007), in reflecting on the UE perspective, emphasizes the difficulty 
inherent to obtaining psychometric data from those in top management positions. Taken 
together, the stratified systems theory legacy and the UE tradition provide irrefutable evidence 
that top management matters for organizational performance and survival and that it makes 
sense on account of its unique nature to distinguish top management from other management 
levels. However, neither approach can predict who will ultimately become a TMT member 
(e.g., Hambrick, 2007), nor do these approaches describe how the selection process for top 
managers takes place. In addition, no studies based on either framework compare individuals 
appointed as top managers to “candidates who were considered but not selected” (Magnusson 
& Boggs, 2006, p.108). In sum, these informative and influential approaches shed some light 
upon but do not solve the mystery of top management selection. 
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Structural Conditions of Top management Decision Making in Organizations 
In order to help uncover the mystery of how top managers are selected, we use the 
theoretical approaches on top management levels to distill several structural conditions that 
we consider unique to top management levels in organizations and that have considerable 
influence on any decision making process at top management levels, including selection 
decisions. While this description and listing of structural conditions is not meant to be 
exhaustive, it serves the purpose of enhancing understanding and conceptualization of the 
selection process for top management positions. 
As a first structural condition, we adopt the key proposition of the stratified systems 
theory, namely that at each consecutive level in the organizational hierarchy, the complexity 
involved in decision making increases (Jaques & Clement, 1991). This high level of 
complexity at top management levels is largely due to interaction with and dependency on 
various stakeholders (e.g., employees, shareholders, customers, and competitors). 
Stakeholders occupy diverse positions both within and outside the organization, representing 
a host of different and often conflicting interests. Furthermore, any decision made at the top 
management level requires taking into account various economic or financial, political, socio-
cultural, and technological considerations, with respect to both the short and the long term 
(Carpenter & Frederickson, 2001; Hooijberg et al., 1997; Hunt, 1991; Zaccaro, 1996). The 
context in which decisions at the strategic level are made is marked by instability, ambiguity, 
and uncertainty due to incomplete information (Jaques & Clement, 1991). Accordingly, 
complexity is the foremost structural condition of top management decision making, 
including succession and selection decisions.  
A second structural condition of the selection process for top management positions is 
high visibility. This condition is directly linked to interaction with and dependency on key 
stakeholders (Harrison, Torres, & Kukalis, 1988), who often control important resources 
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(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). As top managers partly act as figureheads representing their 
organization both inside and outside (Mintzberg, 1975), a CEO succession event is often 
breaking news. This kind of high visibility further increases stakeholder dependency, as 
described by resource dependency theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Because of this 
dependency, key stakeholders are by definition involved in who gets selected. Visibility also 
makes top managers the key target for symbolic gestures such as enforced turnover after a 
take-over (Walsh, 1988). 
A third structural condition of top management selection is that many situations in 
which decision makers and candidates operate can be characterized as relatively weak, 
meaning, there are few clues as to what are appropriate behavioral responses (Bell & Staw, 
1989; Mischel, 1973). In weak situations, individuals do not share a common perception of 
what behavior is expected of them (Beaty, Cleveland, & Murphy, 2001). In contrast, in strong 
situations there is less ambiguity and uncertainty about expected behaviors. In alignment with 
the relative weakness of the situation, the job description of a top management position is 
typically quite open, without a pre-determined set of job characteristics and often without 
objective criteria for performance (Stumpf & London, 1981). In fact, the relationship between 
behavior and results for top managers is rather loose (Hollenbeck, 2009a), and there is no 
“one best way” to do things at the executive level. Therefore it is left to the managerial 
discretion of decision makers (i.e., incumbent top managers) to define (and to candidates to 
figure out) what appropriate success criteria are (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987). 
A fourth structural condition of selection for top management positions is high risk, 
both for decision makers (often incumbents of top management positions themselves) and 
candidates. The risk is not only related to high complexity and visibility inherent to top 
management decision making, but also to possible consequences for those involved in the 
selection process. Top management selection decisions typically involve high risk for 
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decision makers because the selected candidate will become a member of the dominant elite 
(Hambrick & Mason, 1984), and in time may even become their boss. The risk is also directly 
related to material outcomes, in that the process of CEO succession affects share prices 
(Husona, Malatesta, & Parrino, 2004). But there is also high risk involved for candidates, 
because they potentially stand to lose a lot. Their reputation and status could be visibly 
damaged if they are not selected or if they fail in the position. For many, rejection in this 
phase implies exiting the organization, as vividly described in Cannella and Shen’s (2001) 
article on CEO heirs apparent.  
A fifth structural condition of top management selection involves the (potential) use of 
power (Brass & Burkhardt, 1993; Ocasio, 1994; Westphal & Zajac, 1995). Access to and 
adequate use of power is the key to top management success (Kanter, 1979). Different types 
of decision power and power dynamics are important determinants of how decisions are made 
in any TMT (Finkelstein, 1992), with considerable impact on CEO succession decisions 
(Shen & Cannella, 2002). Candidates for top management positions are powerful on account 
of their accumulated experiences, reputation, and access to internal and external networks 
(Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2004), which allows them to make realistic threats, such as leaving 
for the competition (Giambatista, Rowe, & Riaz, 2005). Since top managers operate in 
situations that are relatively weak and often unstructured, there is ample room for the 
discretionary use of power (Kanter, 1979).  
In summary, we argue that under structural conditions of high complexity, high 
visibility, weak situations, high risk, and high power use, top management decision making 
will differ considerably from decision making at lower levels of management, which also 
holds for selection decisions. Following Hollenbeck (2009a), we call for differentiating top 
management selection from selection at lower levels, as these processes are decidedly 
different. Top management selection under such structural conditions is a textbook example 
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of “judgment under uncertainty” (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982), which renders 
traditional selection procedures less likely to occur and less appropriate at top management 
levels. Our first proposition refers to this difference between top management selection and 
lower level selection based on structural conditions of top management levels in organizations 
(see Figure 1, later in this article). 
Proposition 1. Under one or more of the following structural conditions: (a) high 
complexity; (b) high visibility; (c) weak situations; (d) high risk; and (e) high power 
use, top management selection will be different from lower level selection to a larger 
extent. 
 
Beyond what we know about these structural conditions, and in spite of the clear need 
for further research on and conceptualization of top management selection (Hollenbeck, 
2009a), there are surprisingly few peer-reviewed journal articles on top management 
selection, executive selection, or top management promotion. There are, however, some 
related research traditions relevant to our conceptualization of top management selection: 
tournament theory (Rosenbaum, 1979) and upward mobility systems (Ishida, Su, & 
Spilerman, 2002) as well as promotion decision models and promotion systems theory (Ferris, 
Buckley, & Allen, 1992; Stumpf & London, 1981). Furthermore, we briefly address research 
on human resource (HR) practices related to executive and director selection (Hollenbeck, 
2009a, 2009b; Withers et al., 2012), and CEO succession and succession planning (Cappelli, 
2011; Giambatista et al., 2005). On the one hand, these sources serve to illustrate relevant 
aspects, antecedents, and consequences of top management selection. On the other hand, these 
sources implicitly or explicitly serve to underline the existing lack of theorizing and research 
on top management selection. 
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Upward Mobility Systems and Tournament Theory 
Upward mobility systems such as contest versus sponsored mobility (Turner, 1960) 
and tournament models (Rosenbaum, 1979) provide insight into selection decisions and 
managerial careers. Contest mobility refers to an open market for top positions, where 
candidates are continuously screened and where performance determines success. Because 
candidates can later compensate for poor performance in earlier stages, the selection for top 
management positions occurs relatively late in the career (Turner, 1960). Sponsored mobility 
refers to a closed market for top positions, with early screening for potential (and thus elite 
creation), and where origin and background determine success. Because speed of 
advancement accelerates for the chosen few, the selection of candidates for top management 
positions occurs quite early in the career. Sponsors are members of the dominant elite 
(typically top managers themselves) who use their influence to advocate for candidates and 
actively create career opportunities for them (Ibarra, Carter, & Silva, 2010; Turner, 1960). In 
contrast to these ahistorical systems that are path independent, Rosenbaum (1979) proposed a 
historical model, in which advancing to the top is modeled as taking part in a tournament, 
where candidates compete continuously for promotion (Green & Stokey, 1983; Schwarz & 
Severinov, 2010). Each round of the tournament consists of one or more competitions in 
which two or more candidates compete (Conyon & Sadler, 2001). Only the “winner” is able 
to participate in a new competition for an even higher level position. A tournament promotion 
procedure is economically efficient when monitoring of individual performance is difficult 
(Lazear & Rosen, 1981). Since tournament theory was considered too restricted to serve as a 
model for actual promotions (Tong & Leung, 2002), dynamic tournament models have been 
proposed (Schwarz & Severinov, 2010; Tong & Leung, 2002), in which promotion is 
determined by the cumulative result of a large number of competitions, and where “losers” of 
a competition remain in the tournament.  
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Ishida, Su, and Spilerman (2002) evaluate different conceptual mobility systems using 
personnel records from two companies. Based on their findings, and inconsistent with the 
predictions of tournament theory, the promotion process could be described as a “two-step 
process of selection: the gate-keeping model, which filters out a small portion of employees 
who do not meet the minimum standards, and the contest model, which allows the remaining 
employees to compete for higher positions without being affected by their earlier 
performance” (Ishida et al., 2002, p. 179). As only a limited number of candidates gets access 
to the top management selection process, in this type of selection the so-called gate-keeping 
function is crucial in making sure resources are reserved only for the lucky few (Ishida et al., 
2002). Gate-keepers are those organizational players who by the nature of their power can 
either provide or deny access to jobs, internal promotions, or developmental opportunities 
(Bosley, Arnold, & Cohen, 2007). 
In contrast to Ishida et al. (2002), Graen, Dharwadkar, Grewal, and Wakabayshi 
(2006) do find support for an early-screening, one-stage model. Graen et al. (2006) argue that 
the apparent use of “a two-stage process may be a management technique to encourage 
competitive behavior” (p. 157), similar to contest mobility.  
Although these theoretical traditions related to mobility systems are highly relevant for 
our understanding of the selection process for top management positions, it does not enhance 
our insight into who gets selected, how selection is done, and on what criteria selection is 
based. Still, it serves as a source of inspiration in terms of modeling the selection process as 
stages and competitions resulting in a rank-ordering of candidates, with gate-keepers and 
sponsors, winners and losers. 
Promotion Decisions and Systems 
Another theoretical tradition relevant to top management selection refers to promotion 
systems and management promotion decisions. Ferris and colleagues (1992) proposed a 
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theory of organizational promotion systems, modeling the relationships between antecedents 
(e.g., organizational factors), promotion system characteristics (e.g., role of politics), and 
outcomes (e.g., organizational performance, turnover). Some of the relationships in this model 
have consequently been empirically tested (Allen, 1997). However, the different promotion 
types (e.g., “from-within”) and methods (e.g., “informal nomination”) distinguished in the 
model are not described in much detail and it is not clear how these differences affect 
promotion outcomes. Stumpf and London (1981) develop a model of the decision process 
regarding management promotions, including antecedents (e.g., promotion system and 
policies, attributes of the decision maker), the decision process itself (e.g., search for, 
evaluation of, and choice of candidates), and outcomes (e.g., promoting the best available 
candidate). Organizations often rely on their performance appraisal systems to provide a 
criterion for promotion decision effectiveness (Stumpf & London, 1981), which means that 
the content of performance appraisals at higher organizational levels can serve as a standard 
or target for promotion to those levels. Furthermore, when the appraisal is done by a top 
manager, the social context of promotion-oriented performance appraisal systems becomes 
important. Appraisal in that case is less a matter of rater accuracy or measurement validity 
and more of social dynamics (Levy & Williams, 2004). This conceptualization highlights 
important aspects of the management promotion decision, such as the role of the decision 
maker and the relationship between effectiveness estimates and objective indices (Stumpf & 
London, 1981). However, its suggestions for further empirical research have received little 
follow-up and its propositions have not been tested. Furthermore, Stumpf and London (1981), 
while referring to the “creation of vacancies down the organizational hierarchy, requiring a 
chain of promotion decisions” (p. 539), do not address whether the hierarchical level (i.e.. top 
management compared to lower management) affects the nature or the outcomes of the 
decision making process.  
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In summary, while certainly relevant to top management selection in terms of 
identifying relevant characteristics, antecedents, and outcomes of promotion systems and 
promotion decisions, the theoretical traditions described here do not provide sufficient 
information about selection for top management position as a unique process.  
Research on Relevant HR Practices 
Our literature review on the structural conditions of top management levels in 
organizations, including decision making, mobility systems, and promotion decisions has 
provided the necessary but still insufficient basis for a conceptualization of top management 
selection. In this section we therefore briefly describe and review the state of the art in 
empirical research on HR practices relevant to the selection process for top management 
positions, namely executive and director selection, succession planning, and CEO succession. 
 Executive and director selection. In their review of recent trends in the selection 
literature, Viswesvaran and Ones (2010) outline what they call the predominant selection 
model. While a variety of models of personnel selection exist, Viswesvaran and Ones (2010) 
posit that their model captures the ground rules of most existing employee selection models: 
(1) identifying the requisite tasks and domains of behaviors to be exhibited; (2) identifying the 
knowledge, skills, abilities (KSAs), and other characteristics needed to accomplish those tasks 
and behave in ways that facilitate the organization’s goals; (3) generating a pool of applicants 
for the job; (4) developing predictor measures to assess individual differences in the requisite 
KSAs and other characteristics among the applicants; (5) administering the predictor 
measures to the applicants; and finally (6) choosing, on the basis of their predictor scores, 
those applicants most likely to succeed as employees. Zaccaro (2010), in an extensive review 
of both scientific and practitioner oriented sources on executive selection, argues that the 
process of selecting top managers, while ideally reflecting the steps of the predominant 
selection model as outlined by Viswesvaran and Ones (2010), is more complicated than and 
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qualitatively different from selection at lower levels. The main issue in executive selection, 
however, according to Zaccaro (2010), is that decision makers (often executives themselves) 
who select top managers typically do not possess, or use, the knowledge and skills needed to 
accomplish successful executive selection. 
Recently, Hollenbeck (2009a) effectively argued that high rates of executive failure 
and the virtual absence of I/O psychologists in making executive selection decisions demand a 
better understanding of the executive selection process, even if executive failure is not 
necessarily attributable to failure of executive selection (Hollenbeck, 2009a; 2009b). As a 
starting point, Hollenbeck (2009a) called for differentiating executive selection from selection 
at lower levels, mainly because, as argued previously, top management positions are very 
different than lower levels jobs, because there is a loose coupling between executive behavior 
and results, and because there is no “one best way” to do things at the executive level. 
Similarly, Fernández-Aráoz (2005) shows that there is inherent difficulty in determining what 
is needed in terms of KSAs for top management positions, because “what is needed today can 
be quite different from what is required tomorrow” (p. 66). In addition, “most senior 
executives have precious little time for a thorough evaluation and are likely to be extremely 
concerned about the confidentiality of the process […]. As a result, their participation in any 
assessment will likely be very limited” (Fernández-Aráoz, 2005, p. 66).  
Sebora and Kesner (1996), in a review and conceptualization of CEO selection, state 
that the final selection decision does not indicate the realities of the decision making process, 
both in terms of how the decision was made and who participated in the decision making. In 
order to understand the decision process involved in CEO selection, Sebora and Kesner 
(1996) propose a model that includes three selection components with a basic order: 
aspiration, judgment, and justification. Sebora and Kesner (1996) propose that the actual 
ordering of these components and especially of the justification of the decision depends on 
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three important situational factors, namely (1) the performance of the organization, (2) the 
availability of qualified candidates, and (3) the standardization of the CEO’s task description 
at the moment of the succession decision. While certainly interesting, according to our best 
knowledge, their propositions have not yet been tested in further research.  
In their recent review of literature on and conceptualization of the process of director 
selection, Withers et al. (2012, p. 245) describe the decision process as the “formal process by 
which individuals are identified, screened, nominated, and elected (appointed) to corporate 
boards.” Integrating the dominant and often opposing rational and social perspective on 
director selection, they identify several relevant firm, board, candidate, and environmental or 
contextual determinants of director selection, but they fail to conceptualize how the actual 
selection process takes place and how informal practices may shape the appearance and order 
of the formal process, let alone its outcomes. 
Succession planning and CEO succession. Cappelli (2011), in a recent and extensive 
review of succession planning, defines succession planning as the “process of anticipating and 
planning for the replacement of important employees in an organization” (Cappelli, 2011, 
p.673). Cappelli (2011) identifies four steps that are fundamental to succession planning: (1) 
identification of vacancies likely to occur, (2) forecasting the turnover rate, in terms of when 
and where vacancies will occur, (3) identification of candidates, and (4) leadership 
development. While there is considerable overlap between succession planning and 
(executive) selection as described previously, especially in step 3, succession planning is not 
aimed at selection for (or predicting performance in) a particular job, but rather a category of 
jobs, such as senior management (Cappelli, 2011). Two extensive reviews of empirical studies 
on succession events exist (cf. Kesner & Sebora, 1994; and Giambatista et al., 2005, which 
covers studies published after 1994), each looking at the antecedents, characteristics, and 
outcomes of the succession event. A separate research tradition looks exclusively at CEO 
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succession (e.g.,  Bommer & Ellstrand, 1996; Pitcher, Chreim, & Kisfalvi, 2000), in some 
cases linking this type of research directly to the upper echelon perspective (Karaevli, 2007).   
Beyond studying the effects of CEO succession on organizational performance, one of 
the central issues in CEO succession research appears to be the decision to appoint an internal 
heir apparent, an internal non-heir, or an external outsider (Cannella & Shen, 2001; Shen & 
Cannella, 2002; Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2004). An emerging field is the growing influence of 
executive search firms in CEO succession, which has resulted in large parts of the succession 
process taking place outside the organization (Cappelli, 2011). Overall, and in contrast to 
executive selection, succession appears to be a well developed research topic. However, Lin 
and Li (2004, p. 33), identify “an alarming lack of systematic consideration” of the broader 
context in the succession literature. In addition, Cappelli (2011) argues that despite all of the 
evidence collected on succession events, we still do not know very much about the details of 
the executive succession process and about succession planning as such. This knowledge gap 
exists because most empirical studies of succession have been done from a financial and/or 
strategic rather than a HR or social perspective. Magnusson and Boggs (2006, p. 108) show 
that only a few succession studies looked at the “events leading up to selection” (Cannella & 
Shen, 2001; Vancil, 1987), or at the “pool of candidates considered for an available CEO 
position” (Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2004).  
In conclusion, empirical evidence on the top management selection process itself is 
very limited and the few other relevant conceptualizations we were able to find have rarely 
received follow-up. Our literature review of several theoretical traditions and research on 
relevant HR practices has provided us with some insights into top management selection, 
while at the same time highlighting that much remains to be discovered about the selection 
process for top management positions. 
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Conceptualization of the Arena 
Based on our description of the structural conditions for top management selection and 
the proposed distinction between selection at lower and higher hierarchical levels in 
organizations, we propose a critical and integrative conceptual framework for top 
management selection, using the metaphor of the “arena”. Our conceptual framework is 
visualized in Figure 1, with different structural conditions, situational components, and 
cognitive features of the arena connected by means of numbered arrows representing each 
research proposition. First, we argue in detail why selection at the top management level is 
relative rather than absolute.  
Absolute versus Relative Selection 
Stumpf and London (1981) discuss different types of decision rules used for screening 
candidates for management promotion decisions.  These rules differ in the degree to which 
candidates are evaluated on their own merit versus compared to each other. As a function of 
the structural conditions described previously, it is proposed that selection at lower levels in 
organizations is more likely to involve evaluations of individual merit, whereas selection for 
top management is likely to involve interpersonal comparisons. In CEO succession, Sebora 
and Kesner (1996, p.185) find that “the process generally involves an initial non-
compensatory evaluation on some ‘absolute’ or threshold criteria. These threshold criteria are 
few […]; Candidates who do not meet threshold values are eliminated. This initial evaluation 
is followed by another evaluation, the purpose of which is to allow the board to select one 
candidate from among those who satisfied the threshold values. This second evaluation is 
based on ‘comparable’ (or compensatory) criteria,”  
Following Sebora and Kesner (1996), we argue that at lower organizational levels, 
absolute selection is the norm. Absolute refers to the comparison of a candidate to a pre-
determined standard or threshold and is not meant to imply objectivity, because subjectivity 
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and decision bias may play a considerable role in any selection process (Highhouse, 2008; 
Perry et al., 1994). In the selection process for lower level positions, candidates’ personal 
attributes (such as intelligence and motivation) are measured, and subsequently summarized 
(using attribute weights and a combination rule) in a personal attribute end score, as is 
common in assessment centers (Jansen & Vinkenburg, 2006). Ultimately, candidates with the 
largest attribute sum score are selected. This process takes the form of choice optimization. 
Properties of absolute selection are explicit selection criteria, explicit personal attributes, 
objective measurement (e.g., by a general mental ability (GMA) test or a standardized 
interview with large validities), and individual procedures, in the sense that applicants are not 
in direct competition with each other.  
In contrast, we propose that the selection process for top management positions is pre-
dominantly structured as relative (or compensatory, Sebora & Kesner, 1996) selection. 
Personal attributes are not explicitly measured, there is no compilation of some sort of 
personal end score on a pre-established set of attributes, and the use of formalized selection 
methods, including interviews and assessment centers, is limited (Zaccaro, 2010). Instead, 
candidates are directly compared on their overt behaviors or attributes in a specific and 
critical work situation—e.g., giving a presentation or negotiating a deal. Candidates are 
interpersonally compared by other top managers on their effectiveness in handling the 
situation and, in the case of more than two candidates, rank-ordered. We propose that in the 
case of management selection, absolute selection and relative selection are ordered in a fixed 
sequence across the hierarchy. Lower levels are characterized by absolute selection, top levels 
by relative selection. This distinction is similar to the two-step process of selection described 
by Ishida et al. (2002), with the gate-keeping model in the first step and the contest model in 
the second step. However, the transition from absolute to relative selection is gradual and 
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likely to be context specific, thus making it difficult to make a general prediction as to exactly 
when one type of selection replaces the other.  
Proposition 2. Decision rules in the arena differ from those for lower-level selection, 
such that relative or compensatory selection is more prevalent at top management 
levels and absolute selection is more prevalent for lower level selection. 
Following tournament theory (Rosenbaum, 1979), candidates who are successful at 
lower organizational levels where absolute selection is the norm, may ultimately gain 
admittance into the arena as a “prize,” which guarantees a minimal competency level of all 
candidates present in the arena. Once inside the arena, at higher organizational levels where 
relative selection is the norm, success or the “prize” implies the attainment of a top position, 
ultimately that of CEO. In analogy with literary prizes or executive searches, candidates may 
get long-listed (i.e., allowed to enter the arena), may get short-listed (i.e., judged to be 
successful in arena situations), and may win the prize (i.e., granted a top management 
position). Following Hollenbeck (2009b), we view top management selection as a part of a 
comprehensive succession process, rather than a static decision at a given point in time, 
entailing series of interpersonal comparisons of candidates by decision makers.  
Situational Components of the Arena 
 Following from the qualification of top management selection as relative, we 
conceptualize the arena to represent the selection process for top management positions, 
characterized by (a) situated performance in specific social work situations, in which (b) 
interpersonal competition and comparison between candidates takes place on the basis of (c) 
primarily emergent selection criteria, where (d) decision makers from the dominant elite 
decide who succeeds. Further, we propose that (e) criteria for admittance or entry into the 
arena differ from the selection or success criteria salient in the arena itself. These situational 
components of the arena are visualized in Figure 1 and will be explained here in more detail. 
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 Situated performance in arena situations. In the arena, selection decisions are based 
on situated performance (Anand & Watson, 2004); that is, on interpersonal behaviors in 
specific social and real life work situations, rather than on outcomes of formalized and 
standardized methods such as test scores or assessment centers with its artificial situations. 
Anand and Watson (2004, p. 66) follow Goffman (1959) “in understanding situated 
performance as a dramaturgical interaction that is socially negotiated between performers and 
their audiences in very specific contexts.” Depending on the aim of the selection process, the 
setting of this kind of situation can be intra-organizational or inter-organizational (Anand & 
Watson, 2004). Intra-organizational examples of such arena situations are client presentations, 
board meetings, and shareholder councils. Examples of inter-organizational situations are 
networking events or meetings of partners in strategic alliances. Often, informal inter-
organizational situations (e.g., a golf tournament) are organized as mechanism for acquiring 
and reinforcing reputation. Tournament rituals and ceremony play an important role (Anand 
& Watson, 2004). Arena situations often have a dramatic and highly competitive appearance 
similar to sports matches or battle fields where matches or duels are played out openly in the 
presence and collective attention of the dominant elite (i.e., top managers). This dramatic 
appearance is evidenced in the frequent use in discourse on top management selection and 
CEO succession of metaphors of competitive games, duels, and even warfare (e.g., “passing 
the baton,” Vancil, 1987; “headhunting,” Hamori, 2010).  
Proposition 3: The degree of formalization and standardization of the selection 
process differs between arena and lower level selection, such that (a) selection 
policies and procedures in the arena are often less formally delineated than for lower 
level selection, and (b) selection is more often based on situated performance in social 
situations in the arena than in lower level selection. 
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 Interpersonal comparisons by decision makers. In the absence of normative standards 
for executive selection, the best alternative solution (especially when there are only a few 
candidates) is direct interpersonal comparison (Ones & Dilchert, 2009). Indeed, the relative 
nature of selection of candidates for top management positions in social work situations 
ideally requires both candidates’ and decision makers’ presence in the same situation. This 
presence allows for interpersonal comparisons of visible social behaviors of candidates by 
decision makers. The decision makers in the selection process for top management positions 
typically are current top managers and/or non-executive board members, who represent the 
dominant elite or coalition of the organization (Hollenbeck, 2009a; Zaccaro, 2010). As argued 
by Stumpf and London (1981), these decision makers can have a strong impact on both the 
decision process and its outcomes, especially when policies and procedures for the 
identification and evaluation of candidates are not delineated.  
Proposition 4: Top management selection is more effective when direct interpersonal 
comparisons of candidates can be made by decision makers, requiring candidates and 
decision makers to be physically present in the same social situation.  
Selection criteria. While selection criteria at lower organizational levels are often pre-
determined, well described, and transparent for organization members (Viswesvaran & Ones, 
2010), some if not all selection criteria for top management positions appear to be emergent—
i.e., they arise from the situation at issue. The emphasis is on overt, interpersonal behaviors of 
candidates in social situations—situated situated performance (Anand & Watson, 2004).  
However, in most arena situations there are no pre-determined lists of behavioral criteria with 
matching rating scales as there would be in assessment centers (Zaccaro, 2010). Furthermore, 
if criteria emerge from the situation, the same behavior, such as speaking in a loud voice, may 
be helpful in one situation (e.g., taking the lead in a group discussion), but detrimental in 
another (e.g., displaying appropriate table manners). In addition to behavioral criteria for 
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selection, a host of personal attributes, mere presence in a particular situation, covert or even 
hidden selection criteria, as well as non-performance factors may play a considerable role in 
the selection process (Beehr & Taber, 1993). Useem and Karabel (1986) describe pathways to 
the boardroom, showing that an upper class background increases the likelihood of rising to 
the top ranks of corporate management. Even if the influence of elite social and educational 
credentials on U.S. board appointments is not always evident (Westphal & Stern, 2006), such 
credentials may have a strong influence in top management selection processes (Hambrick, 
2007). In France for example subtleties of language, such as accent and style, are a major 
factor in upward mobility and preserving privileges (Bourdieu, 1989; Hambrick, 2007). 
The emergent nature of selection criteria combined with structural conditions, such as 
the weak nature of the situation and open job descriptions for top management positions, 
leave latitude of action for the dominant elite. This latitude opens the possibility of selection 
decisions based on irrelevant but clearly visible attributes, such as gender, race, age, 
attractiveness, dress, and manners (e.g., Stumpf & London, 1981). As argued previously, the 
arena allows for the occurrence of contest mobility, of sponsored mobility, or of a 
combination of both (Ishida et al., 2002). In a situation of contest mobility, we expect that the 
dominant selection criterion is situated performance or behavior in arena situations (e.g., 
introducing a new client, presenting an innovation award), making success contingent upon 
the organizational context and the specific setting. In a situation of sponsored mobility, we 
expect that hidden selection criteria become more dominant, such as having a particular 
sponsor, alma mater, or socioeconomic background. 
Proposition 5: Selection criteria used in the arena are different from those used for 
lower level selection, such that (a) arena criteria are less likely to be predetermined 
and are less formalized than lower level selection criteria and (b) arena criteria more 
often emerge from the situation than lower level selection criteria.  
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Arena entry versus arena success. As described by Ciampa (2005), “at the very top of 
a company, a subtle sorting process reveals who might become CEO and who won’t. The 
irony is, what makes you a contender isn’t enough to make you a winner” (p. 46). Following 
the notion of a two-step process of selection described by Ishida et al. (2002), we argue that 
the selection criteria that predict which candidates will enter the arena (i.e., who will be 
considered for top management positions) differ from selection criteria that predict success in 
the arena (i.e., who will achieve a top management position). The exact moment or time of 
entry into the arena is hard to predict and may depend strongly on the type and size of the 
organization. Here the focus is on what determines arena entry versus arena success. 
A meta-analysis of studies on predictors of objective career success (Ng, Eby, 
Sorensen, & Feldman, 2005) shows that human capital (e.g., experience, education) is an 
important salary determinant, while social capital (e.g., network access) and sponsorship are 
especially important determinants of promotion. In addition to human and social capital, 
Kanter (1977) argues that reputation is crucial when being considered for a top management 
position, especially because at these levels measuring and monitoring individual performance 
is often difficult (Lazear & Rosen, 1981). Furthermore, Bourdieu (1989) addresses the crucial 
importance of cultural capital in organizational careers. Cultural capital refers “to attributes 
related to taste […], art, education and forms of language” (Tatli & Özbilgin, 2012, p. 192), 
acquired as a product of socialization within a certain social class. Candidates who embody 
cultural capital (e.g., through language or taste) similar to that of the dominant organizational 
elite are more likely to be considered for promotion (Tatli & Özbilgin, 2012).  
We argue that arena entry is predominantly determined by human capital factors, such 
as education, experience, competence, and an individual track record of excellent 
performance (Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Ng et al., 2005). Organizational “career logics” 
shape managerial careers as a roadmap for the acquisition of firm specific human capital in 
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terms of relevant experiences and responsibilities (Gunz, 1988). Reputation matters as 
decision makers, often through their network (Gersick, Bartunek, & Dutton, 2000; Seibert, 
Kraimer, & Liden, 2001), “know” whether a candidate has been effective at lower levels. 
When early performance is the only criterion used to decide on arena entry, which is likely 
under conditions of contest mobility, candidates essentially start with a “clean slate” in the 
arena (Hurley, Wally, Segrest, Scandura, & Sonnenfeld, 2003). When other factors matter 
(e.g., prestige of degree), which is likely under conditions of sponsored mobility, relatively 
late entrants to the arena may still have the advantage a good reputation (Kilduff & 
Krackhardt, 1994).  
The transition from lower management to top management has been described in 
terms of critical career passages or transitions (Charan, Drotter, & Noel, 2001). For each 
passage to be successful, the acquisition of transitional skills (i.e., learning what is needed to 
make it from one level to the next) is required. Ibarra, Snook, and Guillen Ramo (2010) 
conceptualize leadership development in terms of the identity transition involved in moving to 
more senior levels. Similarly, the “changing-tasks” model described by Mitchel (1975) 
implies that moving up and across the hierarchy requires the mastery of different skills. While 
functional competencies and intellectual abilities are necessary for performing well at lower 
levels, interpersonal competencies are necessary for moving up and for performing well at 
higher levels (Hogan, Curphy, & Hogan, 1994; Luthans, 1988). Operational competence over 
time becomes a negative predictor of objective career success in management (Boudreau, 
Boswell, Judge, & Bretz, 2001; Jansen & Vinkenburg, 2006). When relative selection is 
dominant, intelligence (or general mental ability, GMA) may well be a non-significant 
predictor of who wins the CEO succession contest. GMA’s positive effects on executive 
performance are likely to be “cancelled out” in interpersonal comparisons, not because there 
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is no variability in GMA among executives (Ones & Dilchert, 2009), but because at the very 
top GMA is not what makes the difference.  
As a consequence, while arena entry is mainly determined by human capital and 
reputation, arena success (i.e., achieving a top management position) will depend largely on 
social capital and related social skills (Brass, Galaskiewics, Greve, & Tsai, 2004). Being able 
to secure benefits and resources by virtue of membership in social networks (Portes, 1998) is 
crucial under the structural conditions of top management as described in the previous 
section. As the selection process leaves latitude of action for the dominant elite to base their 
selection decision on emergent criteria, having a sponsor becomes essential (Ibarra et al., 
2010). Kilduff and Krackhardt (1994) show that candidates’ network as perceived by others 
may be even more important than their actual network. Indeed, “as reflections of social 
identity, networks also serve as signals to others about the current status or probable future of 
an individual. The ability to signal desirable traits such as competence and career 
advancement potential in turn affects[…]” individuals’ ability to attract influential actors to 
their network circle (Ibarra, Kilduff, & Tsai, 2005, p. 365). Cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1989) 
serves as a further tool to enhance one’s status in the eyes of the dominant elite and to 
distinguish oneself in terms of behaviors and attitudes from others with less cultural capital. 
Capitalizing on one’s social and cultural resources requires various social skills and 
behaviors, with impression management and self-monitoring as particularly important 
attributes. Impression management (i.e., efforts to be liked and to appear competent), while a 
general predictor of career success, is especially effective for those who are politically skilled 
(Harris, Kacmar, Zivnuska, & Shaw, 2007). Similarly, self-monitoring (i.e., closely 
monitoring oneself in order to ensure appropriate or desired public appearances) is expected 
to be an important predictor of success in the arena. High self-monitors are more effective in 
ingratiation and self-promotion (Turnley & Bolino, 2001), more effective in networking 
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(Mehra, Kilduff, & Brass, 2001), and more successful as managers (Kilduff & Day, 1994). 
Self-monitoring in terms of managing impressions to meet perceived TMT characteristics is a 
recipe for success, as Snyder and Copeland (1989) argue that high self-monitors “may be 
particularly willing and able to tailor and fashion an image to match the position into which 
they hope to be promoted” (p. 16). Finally, discriminative ability or sensitivity to situational 
cues (Mischel, 1973) is crucial in reading the typical weak situations characteristic of the 
arena, to discover selection criteria and to determine which kind of behavior to display. In 
summary, we propose that: 
Proposition 6. Entry into the arena is decided on the basis of different factors than 
success in the arena: (a) human capital and reputation determine who will be 
admitted into the arena (i.e., who will be considered for a top management position); 
and (b) social capital, cultural capital, impression management, self-monitoring, and 
discriminative ability determine who will be successful in the arena (i.e., who will 
ultimately achieve a top management position). 
Cognitive Features of the Arena and the Role of Decision Bias 
In this section, we consider several cognitive features of the selection process for top 
management positions, including the role of decision bias and judgment errors. Perry and 
colleagues (1994, p. 793), taking a cognitive perspective on selection decisions, argue that 
“organizational decision makers […] are imperfect evaluators who render social judgments 
about job applicants.” Similarly, Prendergast and Topel (1993) argue that performance 
appraisals leave room for supervisor preferences and biases, because it is a process in which 
“humans judge other humans” (p. 355). Based on our description of the structural conditions 
and situational components of top management selection, there are several arguments as to 
why decision making in the arena is especially imperfect. 
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Rank-ordering candidates and intransitivity. As described previously, in the arena 
decision makers need to establish a rank-order of candidates based on pair-wise comparisons. 
Because it is difficult to monitor individual job performance and to measure relevant 
attributes of candidates for top management positions (Lazear & Rosen, 1981), decision 
makers often rely on signals of ability (Feldman & March, 1981; Hamori, 2006). A 
particularly important signal is outperforming competitors in arena situations. In the arena, 
candidates are often openly confronted with each other. In this sense, the arena appears to be 
an efficient selection procedure because there is no need to explicitly measure attributes. 
However, the question remains whether the behavior or attributes observed are relevant to and 
predictive of performance in top management positions.  
Furthermore, series of pair-wise comparisons are likely to lead to intransitive 
outcomes (Suppes & Zinnes, 1963), where a loop of preference is produced similar to the 
game of rock, paper, and scissors. Candidate A is the winner of comparison (A, B), B is the 
winner of comparison (B, C), but C is the winner of comparison (A, C). Intransitivity is 
caused by multidimensional (multi-attribute) choice, i.e., the comparisons are based on 
different attributes. While candidate A may possess superior presentation skills, candidate B 
may be much more decisive, and candidate C may have the highest socioeconomic status. 
Efficiency follows from the differential weighing of the comparison outcomes, especially 
when this process entails a discussion among decision makers about which criterion is 
considered most important. Sebora and Kesner (1996, p. 185) state that this kind of 
interpersonal comparison followed by a discussion “allows the board to compensate a high 
value on one criterion for a low value on another and choose a candidate who provides the 
best overall satisfaction of the aspiration level.” Because of intransitivity, the arena is an 
efficient decision process (Payne, 1982) that is clearly popular among decision makers. 
However, intransitivity may result in inconsistencies across different selection rounds and to 
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suboptimal outcomes (i.e., when the ultimate “winner” does not prove to be the best possible 
candidate), especially if there is little or no discussion among decision makers.  
Proposition 7. As a consequence of interpersonal comparisons and intransitivity, 
arena is more efficient (in term of time and money) but less effective (in terms of 
suboptimal outcomes) than lower level selection with its absolute and formalized 
selection methods. 
Reducing intransitivity is difficult to achieve, as its occurrence appears to increase 
with the number of candidates involved, but to decrease with the number of decision makers 
(Gerhlein, 1983). With few formal mechanisms to manage the numbers of candidates and 
decision makers in most arena situations, the likelihood of intransitivity is hard to predict. 
However, when the outcomes of previous comparisons between candidates co-determine the 
outcome of subsequent comparisons, intransitivity is less likely to occur (Gerhlein, 1983). An 
extreme case of this kind of “history effect” occurs when losing one comparison implies 
leaving the arena immediately. Usually this extreme effect is not the case, however. In 
dynamic tournaments (Tong & Leung, 2002), “losers” are likely to stay in the arena, at least 
for the short term. At some point, candidates that often lose comparisons may drop out and 
stop competing, with negative consequences for their individual career and possibly for 
organizational performance (Tong & Leung, 2002). However, the two-step model of arena 
entry versus arena success guarantees that differences between candidates are small enough 
for everyone to remain motivated to compete. As absolute selection and arena entry on the 
basis of human capital exclude those not qualified from participation, the arena creates an 
impression of meritocracy, open competition, and fair play (i.e., contest mobility). At the 
same time, the dominant elite can exercise its influence (i.e., sponsored mobility). The arena 
serves to motivate “losers” to stay productive by organizing an unequal distribution of 
resources in an acceptable way (Anand & Watson, 2004). As a consequence, “losers” are 
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likely to stay in the organization, accept power inequalities, keep up the hard work, and often 
cooperate with former competitors who have won the prize and are now in a top management 
position.  
Proposition 8. Arena leads to positive outcomes for organizations in terms of (a) 
retention; (b) commitment; and (c) contribution to organizational performance of 
candidates who are not successful (i.e.,. do not achieve a top management position).  
Bounded rationality. Decision making at the highest level of the organizational 
hierarchy is a typical example of bounded rationality (Simon, 1987), with top management 
selection decisions being qualified as judgment under uncertainty (Kahneman et al., 1982). In 
their review and conceptualization of the director selection process, Withers and colleagues 
(2012) clearly recognize the bounded rationality of decision makers involved in the process. 
In comparing and selecting candidates for top management positions, the rationality of 
decision makers is bounded due to limited information, cognitions, and time. Under these 
conditions, decision makers will typically seek a satisfactory solution rather than an optimal 
one. Under structural conditions of high risk, decision makers (unconsciously perhaps) aim at 
loss minimization instead of choice optimization (Payne, 1982). In this sense, bounded 
rationality is a root cause of intransitivity.  
Furthermore, when it comes down to selecting the next CEO, boards often ultimately 
rely on “gut feelings” (Bennis & O'Toole, 2000; Khurana, 2001), which along with intuition 
are considered non-rational bases for selection decisions (Mumby & Putnam, 1992). 
Similarly, Zaccaro (2010) states that when it comes to top management selection, decision 
makers often apply ad hoc, intuitive procedures that may not produce the best outcomes. 
While some say that using intuition and subjectivity in selection decisions does not explain 
additional variance beyond formal tests of personality and competence (Highhouse, 2008), 
others argue that intuition is “a rational process of learning and experience, one that becomes 
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automatic without systematic analysis” (Mumby & Putnam, 1992, p.471). As such, intuiton 
and gut feelings may in some cases be valid predictors of executive performance (Sorcher & 
Brant, 2002). Bounded rationality may result in judgment errors, however, especially when 
loss minimization is combined with overconfidence or executive hubris (Hambrick et al., 
2005). March and Shapira (1987, in Sebora & Kesner, 1996) conclude that managers are 
typically unrealistically optimistic when it comes to “real” risks, believe they can distinguish 
good risks from bad risks, and think they can in fact change the odds. 
Another possible judgement error inherent to top management selection decisions is 
halo error (i.e., letting one positive attribute outshine all others), which is a serious risk in any 
assessment where performance and potential are judged at the same time (Fernández-Aráoz, 
1999; Pepermans, Vloeberghs, & Perkisas, 2003). Furthermore, judgment errors are even 
more likely to occur when candidates and decision makers are not present in the same social 
situation (e.g., because of dispersed office locations), when reputation replaces behavioral 
evidence and when decision makers are more likely to use heuristics such as 
representativeness and availability (Highhouse, 2002).  
  Similarity attraction and homosocial reproduction. Borrowing inspiration from 
several related theoretical traditions, namely the similarity attraction effect (Byrne & William, 
1969), attraction-selection-attrition theory (Schneider, 1987), and homosocial reproduction 
theory (Kanter, 1977), we posit that top management selection decisions will be positively 
influenced by the degree of (perceived) similarity between decision makers and candidates, 
causing increasing homogeneity (or homosocial reproduction) over time. Decision making is 
influenced by social identity processes (Haslam, 2004). Candidates who are perceived as a 
member of a salient in-group (i.e., the social group into which decision makers categorize 
themselves, such as fraternity, alma mater, or service club) are more likely to be selected than 
out-group members. Considering the notion that the selection criteria in the arena are 
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emergent, in-group favoritism is more likely to occur. Not only are decision makers more 
likely to be attracted to and thus to select and promote candidates that are similar to 
themselves in terms of personality and attitudes, but also in terms of human capital, social 
capital, gender, race, cultural capital, and socioeconomic background (Haslam, 2004; 
Fernández-Aráoz, 1999; Schaubroeck & Lam 2002). As an example, in-group favoritism 
serves to enhance candidates’ (actual) human and social capital acquired at a highly ranked 
university (Useem & Karabel, 1986), resulting in bias of favor of prestigious schools (Judge, 
Cable, Boudreau, & Bretz, 1995). In recent reviews of studies of group-based discrimination 
in performance appraisal and promotion processes respectively, both Roberson, Galvin, and 
Charles (2007) and Avery (2011) provide compelling evidence of the existence of bias in such 
processes, showing a “systematic effect due to category membership (e.g., gender, race, age, 
disability), unrelated to actual performance” (Roberson et al., p. 619). 
While selecting candidates on the basis of similarity may be effective in terms of loss 
minimization (Payne, 1982) and a possible solution to bounded rationality (Simon, 1987), 
homogeneity is not without risks in and of itself. When decision makers constitute a 
homogeneous group, selection decision outcomes are likely to be more biased (Stumpf & 
London, 1981). Decision makers, over time, acquire a generalized mental model (i.e., schema, 
stereotype or prototype, according to Perry et al., 1994, or implicit leadership theory, 
according to Offermann, Kennedy, and Wirtz, 1994) of a typical or ideal top manager, board 
member, or CEO. Perry and colleagues (1994) describe how such mental models guide the 
processing of new information and the retrieval of stored information in selection processes. 
Often, mental models introduce bias into the decision making process by lowering the 
chances for selection of those who are dissimilar to the mental model. This type of often 
implicit and hard to eliminate decision bias is said to be the root cause of discrimination and 
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of the over-representation of white men in top management positions (Tetlock & Mitchell, 
2009).   
In particular, gender bias is likely to be introduced into top management selection 
because competitiveness, assertiveness, and dominance are part of the prototype of a top 
manager (Perry et al., 1994). These attributes are more congruent to the male than the female 
gender role (Eagly & Karau, 2002). Women showing assertive behavior in arena situations 
may experience backlash, because their behavior violates stereotypical female social role 
prescriptions (Rudman & Phelan, 2008). The arena thus has a gendered nature, because of 
homogeneity (i.e., the majority of both decision makers and candidates in the arena are men), 
because of the larger congruency between the top manager prototype and the male gender 
role, but also because competition is inherent to top management selection. Ryan and Haslam 
(2007) show that in those rare cases where a woman is appointed CEO or board member, 
“women are more likely than men to find themselves on a ‘glass cliff’ such that their positions 
of leadership are associated with greater risk of failure” (Ryan & Haslam, 2007, p. 550). 
 In addition to increasing the risk of bias, Daboub, Rasheed, Priem, and Gray (1995) 
show that TMT homogeneity moderates the relationship between control systems and 
corporate illegal activity, because homogeneity is expected to decrease social control. 
Westphal and Khanna (2003) show how social control among the corporate elite may function 
as a tool to “keep directors in line.” In organizations where social control is limited, 
homogeneity may thus increase the likelihood of the occurrence of failure and fraud at the 
board level.  
In conclusion, we argue that on account of the structural conditions and situational 
components of the arena described previously, the negative effects of common cognitive 
features of decision making on top management selection decisions are exacerbated. 
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Proposition 9. Compared to lower level selection, arena suffers more from (a) 
bounded rationality, loss minimization, decision bias, and homogeneity, resulting in 
(b) more side effects and negative outcomes for organizations (i.e., judgment errors, 
discrimination, fraud, and failure). 
Discussion 
Our critical framework of the arena as a metaphor for top management selection, 
distinguishing it from selection and promotion decisions at lower organizational levels, has 
provided insight into a process that remains largely uncharted territory or even a mystery, 
while at the same time being the subject of fascination among researchers as well as 
practitioners. Our conceptualization of the arena may enhance our understanding of the 
reasons why 70% of the variance in executive success remains unexplained (Highhouse, 
2008). In fact, we venture that the very nature of the top management selection process in 
many organizations (e.g., based on interpersonal comparisons of situated performance, 
characterized by homogeneity) is part of the reason why decision makers rely on it. 
Furthermore, decision makers feel comfortable with this type of selection, despite growing 
evidence that using more rigorous and formalized selection tools and procedures may enhance 
the predictive validity of top management selection (Highhouse, 2008). While some authors 
call for more such approaches to executive selection (Hollenbeck, 2009a; Zaccaro, 2010), our 
main interest is in understanding and describing the existing process. In doing so, we 
contribute to the understanding of both executive failure and executive selection failure. Our 
conceptualization offers some implications for the practice of top management selection, in 
recommending (a) direct comparisons between candidates, with decision makers and 
candidates physically present in the same situation, and (b) discussion of the intransitive 
outcomes of selection rounds among decision makers.  
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However, our contribution is critical in the sense that it challenges research traditions 
such as the upper echelon perspective (Hambrick & Mason, 1984) by indicating how top 
management selection is inherently biased. Not only do TMT characteristics affect strategic 
decision making and organizational performance, the typical process of selecting TMT 
members provides ground for side effects and negative outcomes. Because of this critical 
viewpoint, studying the conditions under which the arena is likely to have negative outcomes 
is our first suggestion for further research. This type of investigation requires comparative 
longitudinal studies of top management selection processes and outcomes in different 
organizations as well as (quasi-)experimental designs to test more specific main and 
interaction effects of various variables on selection outcomes. From the conceptual 
framework as represented in Figure 1, parsimonious models of causal relationships between 
specific predictors and outcomes as well as hypotheses to be tested in quantitative empirical 
research could be developed. One suggestion for such empirical studies could be on the role 
of decision makers, namely the extent to which their number and relative power affect 
decision bias and judgment errors. Another interesting venue for further research would be the 
effect of timing and sequencing of different selection rounds and situated performances in the 
arena. Furthermore, future studies should look into how contextual factors (e.g., 
organizational size and age, career logics, sector, profit orientation, governance model, etc.) 
affect the appearance of the arena, as well as the relative or additive influence of structural 
conditions, situational components, and cognitive features on organizational outcomes of top 
management selection in different contexts. 
The effort involved in designing quantitative studies on the arena may be hindered by 
the fact that behavior plays a central role in our conceptualization of the selection process. 
Typically, situated performances are difficult to witness for outsiders, let alone measure. In 
addition, study samples will by definition be small because the population of top managers is 
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small, as well. Moreover, this type of study is quite intrusive and TMTs are “notoriously 
unwilling to submit themselves to scholarly poking and probing” (Hambrick, 2007, p. 337). 
Therefore we feel that other, more qualitative research approaches may provide more insight 
at the next stage of theory development on the arena. We therefore promote qualitative 
research using approaches such as participant observation, repertory grids, narrative analyses 
based on insider accounts of top management selection, and discourse analysis. Three 
examples of such studies are Mills’ (2010) analysis of the nature and rationalization of gossip 
during a CEO succession process, Kumra and Vinnicombe’s (2008) study of the promotion to 
partner process in a consulting firm, and Bilbow’s (1998) analysis of “chair-talk” or 
managerial discourse in board meetings. Several others interested in studying managerial 
elites (e.g.,  Hambrick, 2007; Pettigrew, 1992) have provided inspiring examples of and ideas 
for getting access to a notoriously difficult to catch and busy research population.  
Another promising area for future research on the arena framework relates to the 
continued overrepresentation of men in top management positions (Eagly & Carli, 2007; 
Lyness & Schrader, 2006; World Economic Forum, 2011). As an illustration of how research 
on top management inadvertently contributes to maintaining the gendered status quo, only 
two studies have explicitly incorporated gender diversity into the UE perspective (Anderson, 
2003; Krishnan & Park, 2005), despite the proliferation of studies based on it. Indeed, while 
diversity in demographic characteristics of TMT members is a key component of the 
perspective, Hambrick (2007) simply ignores gender. Thinking about top management 
selection in terms of an arena may not only increase our understanding of the causes of the 
overrepresentation of men in top management positions, but may also provide inroads into 
improving the situation. However, we are acutely aware that by using the arena metaphor for 
top management selection and matching terms such as competition, winning, etc., we may 
inadvertently reproduce the social dominance of men in and thus the gendered nature of the 
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arena. In this sense, the use of a more inclusive metaphor may be a starting point for change. 
However, it is clear that the playing field remains uneven (Avery, 2011), as there are many 
impediments to promotion for others than white men in most organizations.  
A final interesting idea for our research agenda is explicitly looking at the selection of 
external candidates, in order to test whether the general assumptions and propositions of our 
description of the arena for internal selection apply to the selection of external candidates 
(Hamori & Kakarika, 2009). It would be especially interesting to look at the growing 
influence of executive search firms and social media on top management selection processes 
(Hamori, 2010), in particular the consequences of moving the arena partly outside the 
organization.  
In conclusion, we suggest that the arena has developed as an efficient process to 
support the “survival of the fittest” in top management selection. It is an appropriate way to 
deal with highly complex, unstable, ambiguous environments and with uncertainty due to 
incomplete information. This fit to the demands of the situation comes with the price of 
potentially negative outcomes, a cost that has remained mostly unchallenged. However, as a 
consequence of the current economic crisis, the demographic changes in the labor force, and 
the internet age, the side effects and negative outcomes of the arena have become both more 
manifest and less acceptable to important stakeholders as well as to the general public. The 
question remains whether the selection process for top management positions in its current 
shape and form is fit to survive the challenges of our times. 
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Figure 1. The arena: A visualization of the selection process for top management positions and theoretical propositions. 
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